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CONSENT OF THE PARTIES 
 
 Counsel for Appellees consented to the filing of this brief. Counsel for 
Appellants declined to consent. Amici’s motion for leave to file this Amicus Brief 
is enclosed herewith. 
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I. Summary of Argument 	
The District Court correctly determined that Phoenix failed to state a 
trademark claim because Basket Case’s activities cannot have caused any relevant 
confusion.1 Phoenix’s fundamental complaint is about unauthorized use of its 
intangible content—karaoke tracks. Under Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), however, only confusion regarding the source of 
physical goods is actionable under the Lanham Act; confusion regarding the source 
of the karaoke tracks or their authorization is not actionable. Phoenix cannot avoid 
Dastar just because Basket Case creates digital copies of those tracks, as Basket 
Case does not sell digital files or any other physical product bearing the SOUND 
CHOICE mark. Indeed, the only way consumers ever encounter Phoenix’s marks 
is during playback of the karaoke tracks, so any “confusion” could only be the 
result of the content itself. Dastar clearly precludes such a claim.  
Nor can Phoenix avoid Dastar by pointing to other commercial services 
offered by Basket Case, such as its sale of food and beverages. Basket Case does 
not use the Sound Choice mark to designate any such services, and source 
indication cannot be inferred from the use of Phoenix’s marks within the karaoke 
tracks.  
																																																								
1 Phoenix acquired Slep-Tone after Slep-Tone filed its original complaint. See 
Motion for Substitution of Party, March 31, 2015, R.14. For purposes of this brief, 
we refer to Phoenix and Slep-Tone collectively as Phoenix.  
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Finally, Phoenix’s marks cannot be separated from the content. Phoenix 
chose to embed its marks in creative works, and Dastar teaches that control over 
creative works is the province of copyright law, not the Lanham Act.  Accepting 
Phoenix’s argument would open the door to exactly the kind of “mutant copyright” 
rejected by the Supreme Court. 
II. Argument 		
A. Phoenix Fails to Allege Confusion Regarding the Source of Relevant 
Tangible Goods, as Dastar Requires 
 
The gravamen of Phoenix’s complaint is that, without its authorization, 
Basket Case created and used digital copies of Phoenix’s karaoke accompaniment 
tracks. Br. of Appellant at 5. Phoenix alleges that, because the karaoke tracks 
display Phoenix’s SOUND CHOICE marks and its claimed trade dress during 
playback, consumers will be confused about the origin of the karaoke tracks on 
Basket Case’s computer hard drive. See Br. of Appellant at 24.     
Since Basket Case does not sell its digital karaoke tracks, however, it is 
implausible that consumers would be confused about their origin; indeed, 
consumers almost certainly have no idea whether the tracks are being performed 
from a CD or from digital copies. But even if Phoenix were right that consumers 
are likely to believe that Phoenix is the origin of Basket Case’s tracks, Dastar 
makes clear that any such confusion is irrelevant for Lanham Act purposes. 
	 5 
Dastar copied footage from the Crusade in Europe television series 
originally released by Time-Life and re-used that footage in its own video series 
without attribution to Fox (Time-Life’s successor in interest). Dastar, 539 U.S. at 
26–27. According to Fox, this constituted reverse passing off. Dastar was passing 
off Fox’s content as though it were Dastar’s own, thereby falsely designating the 
origin of the video series in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id. at 27.  That 
section makes actionable use of:  
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any 
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial 
activities by another person.  
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).  
The Court held that, as used in the statute, “origin of goods” refers only to 
“the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author 
of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.” Dastar, 539 
U.S. at 37. Thus, while the concept of origin “might be stretched to include not 
only the actual producer” but the party who stood behind production of the 
physical product, “origin of goods” is “incapable of connoting the person or entity 
	 6 
that originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.” Id. at 
31–32.2 
The Court’s construction of the Lanham Act was animated by its concern 
about a conflict between trademark and copyright law, and particularly its concern 
that Fox might use trademark law to gain control over content for which it no 
longer had copyright protection. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (“The right to copy, and to 
copy without attribution, once a copyright has expired…passes to the public.”). 
But Dastar’s holding is not limited to cases involving formerly copyrighted works, 
or even cases in which a valid copyright exists. See Bretford Manufacturing, Inc. v. 
Smith System Manufacturing Corp., 419 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v. 
UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003).3 
Phoenix’s claim here differs from Fox’s claim in Dastar in that Phoenix is 
complaining about the use of its Sound Choice marks rather than a lack of 
attribution. But that difference is immaterial under Dastar because Phoenix still 
does not allege confusion about the source of any physical goods, only confusion 																																																								
2 While the Court in Dastar was interpreting the language of § 43(a) specifically, 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), the same rule applies in cases of infringement of 
registered marks under § 32 despite that section’s slightly less specific language. 
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012). It is well established that the principles applicable to 
registered and unregistered marks are largely the same. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. 
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); Dunn v. Gull, 990 F.2d 348, 351 
(7th Cir. 1993).  
3 A broader range of misrepresentations, if made in “commercial advertising or 
promotion,” are actionable as false advertising under § 43(a)(1)(B).  15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1)(B) (2012). There is no false advertising claim in this case.	
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about the source of the intangible creative content displayed on Basket Case’s 
machines. Indeed, the Supreme Court anticipated—and rejected—precisely the 
distinction Phoenix urges here. Describing the double bind in which would-be 
users of creative content might find themselves if the Lanham Act were interpreted 
to allow claims of false designation of the origin of content, the Court noted that if 
“Dastar had simply copied the television series as Crusade in Europe and sold it as 
Crusade in Europe, without changing the title or packaging (including the original 
credits to Fox),” Fox likely would have brought a passing off claim. Dastar, 539 
U.S. at 36. That claim would have been the same one Phoenix is making here: it 
would have alleged confusion based on the credits to Fox, just as Phoenix alleges 
confusion based on the inclusion of the SOUND CHOICE marks within the 
content.  
Far from endorsing such a claim, the Court invoked this hypothetical to 
demonstrate why “origin” must be understood to refer only to the origin of tangible 
goods. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36 (noting that adopting a definition of “origin” that 
would include the origin of creative content would place “manufacturers of those 
products in a difficult position”). The Court’s interpretation of “origin” ruled out 
not only claims for failing to credit the creator of a work, but also claims based on 
crediting the creator, “if that [crediting] should be regarded as implying the 
	 8 
creator’s ‘sponsorship or approval’ of the copy.” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1)(A).  
Some Seventh Circuit cases have not been precise about Dastar’s holding.  
Eastland Music Corp. v. Lionsgate Entertainment, Inc., for example, 
acknowledged that, for Lanham Act purposes, “origin” means the “producer of the 
tangible product sold in the marketplace.” 707 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2013). Yet 
the Court did not explicitly distinguish physical copies of defendant’s movie from 
the intangible creative work embodied in those copies. See id. (suggesting that “the 
title of a work of intellectual property” would infringe another’s mark “if the title 
falsely implie[d] that the latter author is its origin”). Thus the Court said that the 
plaintiff musical group’s claim would have survived if it could plausibly have 
alleged that “consumers would treat it as the producer or source of the film 50/50, 
or treat Lionsgate as the producer of the 2003 album.” Id.   
However, the distinction between tangible goods and their intangible content 
was central to Dastar’s holding: allegations of confusion regarding the origin of 
content (but not those about the origin of tangible goods) are barred. Indeed, Fox’s 
claim in Dastar was precisely that consumers would be confused about who 
created the content of Dastar’s movies. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (“the gravamen of 
respondents’ claim is that, in marketing and selling Campaigns as its own product” 
	 9 
without attribution, Dastar falsely designated the origin of its video). 4 Fortres 
Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t made the same conflation—treating Warner 
Bros.’ movie, an intangible creative work, as the relevant good. 763 F.3d 696, 703 
(7th Cir. 2014).5   
Likewise, Gensler v. Strabala focused on whether an individual can claim to 
have designed a complex architectural work, or whether instead such buildings are 
team jobs that no one designs.  764 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in 
original). But that question is about the origin of an intangible work—the Gensler 
court even referred to Gensler’s claim as one about the origin of intellectual 
property. Id. at 737. That is wrong under Dastar. Though some false claims about 
actual participation in the design process might be actionable as false advertising 
under §43(a)(1)(B) rather than false designation of origin under §43(a)(1)(A),6 
claims regarding authorship of the intangible work are barred. 
																																																								
4 Eastgate should not have been able to avoid this result simply by alleging that the 
title of the movie was likely to cause confusion about the physical copies of the 
movie, as that allegation would simply be an attempt to evade Dastar by focusing 
on irrelevant physical goods. See Section II.B.   
5 The Court in Fortres Grand was considering what goods of Warner Bros. it 
should compare to the plaintiff’s software product in evaluating reverse confusion. 
Id. The court spoke of the relevant “goods” as the “movie,” without specifying 
tangible copies thereof. Id. (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
“goods” in Dastar “likely compels lower courts to look to the movie, since it is the 
junior user’s only tangible product in the marketplace about which consumers 
could be confused”). 
6 The Court even contemplated such a claim when it identified the ways in which 
an architect’s assertion that he designed a building might be false, referring to a 
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B. Basket Case’s Digital Files are not Relevant Goods 	
Phoenix attempts to avoid the Dastar problem by arguing that its marks do 
designate the source of physical goods—the digital files in which the karaoke 
tracks are fixed. Br. of Appellant at 13 (“The accused goods at issue in this 
litigation are the media-shifted karaoke tracks stored on hard drives….”). 
But Basket Case does not sell copies of the karaoke tracks to its customers, 
so it makes no representation to consumers, correct or incorrect, about the source 
of the physical medium in which those videos are fixed. All that Basket Case 
provides to its customers is playback of the karaoke videos while they perform. 
There is therefore no meaningful sense in which Basket Case uses the Sound 
Choice marks “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising” of the digital files, as the statute requires. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a); see 
also id. at § 1125(a)(1) (requiring that the allegedly infringing mark be used “in 
connection with” goods or services); N.A.A.C.P. v. Radiance Foundation, Inc., 786 
F.3d 316, 324 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that “in connection with” requires a nexus 
between the use and a commercial transaction, not just the presence of a mark). 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
case in which the “architect did not have anything to do with the design, never 
having worked on the project.” Id. at 737. That type of claim should be framed as 
false advertising, not false designation of origin. Gensler’s failure to distinguish 
between false advertising claims under §43(a)(1)(B) and false designation of origin 
claims under §43(a)(1)(A) likely explains its reference to POM Wonderful LLC v. 
Coca-Cola Co.,134 S.Ct. 2228 (2014), a false advertising case, in interpreting the 
statute.    
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Phoenix obfuscates by arguing that Basket Case “uses” the Sound Choice 
marks not in connection with the tangible goods, but in connection with its 
commercial operations more broadly. Br. of Appellant at 20. This, however, is not 
a case about “use in commerce” as a jurisdictional prerequisite—it is instead about 
whether Phoenix alleges relevant confusion. And on the confusion question, 
Phoenix focuses on the digital tracks, suggesting that consumers will be confused 
about their origin in the same way consumers are confused by counterfeit Rolex 
watches. Br. of Appellant at 24–25. But that analogy is obviously flawed; watches 
are tangible objects sold to consumers, whereas consumers never interact with 
Basket Case’s digital files as tangible objects, only experiencing playback of the 
content. Had Basket Case streamed the files from YouTube (in which case 
Phoenix’s argument about the physical files would no longer apply), the gravamen 
of Phoenix’s complaint would be exactly the same.  (To the extent Phoenix alleges 
confusion about sponsorship or endorsement of Basket Case’s bar and restaurant 
services, its theory of confusion would be the same even if it had alleged that 
Basket Case had purchased used CDs produced by Slep-Tone.)  
Unlike the physical marking of a counterfeit watch, the only possible 
representation of origin encountered by Basket Case’s consumers is in the video 
content itself—through the appearance of the SOUND CHOICE marks on the 
screen. Dastar, properly understood, bars any Lanham Act claim in which the 
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alleged confusion could only be the result of use of a mark within the creative 
content of a work. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (rejecting an interpretation of “origin 
of goods” that would include “not merely the producer of the physical item…but 
also the creator of the content that the physical item conveys”).   
This is true even though much expressive material is conveyed in physical 
form, and so strategic plaintiffs might often claim that their case is about the source 
of irrelevant physical goods. If it were otherwise, Disney could prevent others from 
selling copies of Steamboat Willie even after its copyright expired by arguing that, 
because Mickey Mouse is in the movie and is Disney’s trademark, consumers will 
be confused about the source of physical copies of the movie. Under Phoenix’s 
interpretation, that claim would survive Dastar because it is nominally focused on 
the source of physical goods, even though in truth it hinges on an assertion that 
consumers will think Disney authorized the reproduction of the content. This 
would create precisely the sort of “mutant copyright law” the Supreme Court 
rejected. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34.7  
																																																								
7 Several recent decisions have understood that, if the plaintiff’s only claim of 
confusion comes from the reproduction of the expressive content of a work, then 
Dastar ought to apply, because origin cannot be inferred from the content alone. 
See, e.g., Pulse Entertainment Corp. v. David, No. CV 14-4732 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
17, 2014) (Dastar barred false designation of origin claim based on explicit 
misattribution of hologram to wrong creator; hologram was creative work like a 
cartoon); Masck v. Sports Illustrated, 5 F. Supp. 3d. 881 (E.D. Mich. 2014) 
(Dastar barred false designation of origin claim based on copying of photos). 
	 13 
Some district courts in this Circuit have concluded that, in copying content 
into a new format, the defendant created a new “good”—the digital track. See, e.g., 
Slep-Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Sellis Enters., 87 F. Supp. 3d 897, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
Whether or not digital files might sometimes count as goods, Dastar precludes 
arguments that confusion will be caused by the content of the works fixed in those 
files. Indeed, Dastar also created new “goods” in this sense—physical copies of its 
videos. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27. The Court nevertheless implicitly refused to infer 
from the creative content anything about the origin of those physical copies when it 
concluded that Dastar had correctly identified the origin of its videos by marking 
the physical copies with its own name. Dastar thus precludes arguments that the 
origin of copies of creative works can be inferred from their intangible content. 
C. Dastar Bars Claims of Confusion Regarding the Origin of 
Services That Are Based Solely on the Content of Creative Works 	
Dastar also bars claims of confusion regarding the origin of services to the 
extent the alleged confusion could only be caused by the content of a creative 
work. Gensler was correct that Dastar does not rule out all claims of confusion 
regarding the source of services. Gensler, 764 F.3d at 736. But even if there may 
be other contexts in which use of Phoenix’s marks would cause actionable 
confusion regarding the source of the Basket Case’s services, such claims cannot 
be based solely on allegedly unauthorized use of content. A movie theater that 
	 14 
shows a public domain movie produced by MGM cannot be subject to an 
infringement claim if MGM simply alleges that the presence of the MGM lion at 
the beginning of the film causes confusion about the source or sponsorship of the 
theater’s entertainment services. Cf. Bretford, 419 F.3d at 580–81 (noting that 
consumers might see marks embedded in other products, and holding that Dastar 
bars claims based solely on that embedding). For the same reason, Phoenix cannot 
succeed on its claims that consumers are likely to be confused about whether 
Basket Case’s shows are sponsored by Phoenix because of the content of the 
karaoke tracks.8  
  
																																																								
8 Phoenix also cannot avoid Dastar by claiming confusion about whether the tracks 
or karaoke performances are “authorized.” The legitimacy of use of content is an 
issue for copyright law, not for the Lanham Act. If Phoenix owns a copyright in its 
tracks, it can bring a copyright infringement claim; otherwise Basket Case does not 
need Phoenix’s authorization to show the videos. Fox could not have succeeded in 
Dastar simply by claiming that Dastar’s use of the Fox content falsely implied that 
Dastar had the right to use that material – that is the same thing, in Lanham Act 
terms, as saying that the content falsely implied source. See Smith v. 
BarnesandNoble.com, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-04374, 2014 BL 263099 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
23, 2014) (barring claims of false representation of affiliation between an author 
and a distributor based merely on sale of copies of author’s book, even if the 
distributor was distributing unauthorized copies); Antidote Int’l Films, Inc. v. 
Bloomsbury Publ’g, PLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that 
Dastar bars a false affiliation claim where “one person is the publisher of a novel 
and the other is the author of the novel, because the holding of Dastar would be 
meaningless if a false authorship claim could be recast in this manner”). 
	 15 
D. Phoenix’s Marks Cannot Be Separated From the Content 	
Phoenix’s marks cannot be separated from the creative content of the 
karaoke tracks.9 For one thing, Phoenix has claimed trade dress rights in the 
graphical displays of its karaoke tracks, particularly the “typeface, style, and visual 
arrangement in displaying the lyrics, the style of displaying entry cues, and other 
elements.” (R.20:¶46). That trade dress obviously cannot be disentangled from the 
audiovisual work—it is the audiovisual work. Thus, accepting Phoenix’s claim 
would conflict directly with Dastar’s holding that copyright law, not trademark 
law, governs copying of expressive content.10   
More fundamentally, separability is not a workable standard. Creative works 
routinely contain recognizable trademarks. The owners of those marks could argue 
that background uses, such as uses of Coca-Cola cans as props, should be edited 
out, or that characters should be morphed to make them look different from 
trademarked characters, while leaving the sequence of events the same. Given the 
																																																								
9 Even if the marks could somehow be separated from the content, they would not 
designate the origin of any tangible good, and that is the only designation that 
matters under Dastar.  
10 See Ho v. Taflove, 696 F. Supp. 2d 950, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding that 
communicative use for expressive purposes is not the kind of use trademark law 
targets), aff’d, 648 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2011); Cyber Websmith, Inc. v. American 
Dental Association, 2010 WL 3075726, No. 09-CV-6198 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 4, 2010) 
(holding that “the inherent misrepresentation that accompanies the unauthorized 
copying and distribution of another’s copyrighted work” is not enough to create a 
Lanham Act cause of action). 
	 16 
existence of powerful digital editing tools that can now be used to replace 
individual elements in a work, these demands could be endless.   
Similarly, prominent recording artists often include their names or 
nicknames in their songs.11  Their names may be valid trademarks.  Because of 
statutory copyright licenses, those artists do not have the power under copyright 
law to control all uses of their songs. 12  If separability were countenanced, 
recording artists could nonetheless assert trademark claims, demanding that songs 
be altered to remove allegedly source-identifying information.13 
Phoenix chose to embed its claimed marks in expressive works in order to 
bootstrap a claim to control goods into a claim to control content.  If there is 
confusion, it is not the kind of confusion trademark law aims to stop, and it is 
																																																								
11 See, e.g., EMINEM, The Real Slim Shady, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP 
(Interscope Records 2000) (using both “Eminem” and “Slim Shady”); DESTINY'S 
CHILD, Dot, on THIS IS THE REMIX (Columbia Records 2002) (“If something's 
wrong blame it on me/B-E-Y-O-N-C-E”). 
12	See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 110 (exempting various performances of musical works), 
114(d) (providing for statutory licenses for non-interactive uses of sound 
recordings); 115 (providing for compulsory licenses to make and distribute 
phonorecords of musical works).	
13 Indeed, artists whose names are in their works, or who claim trademark rights in 
song titles or phrases, see, e.g., Kory Grow, Taylor Swift Trademarks ‘This Sick 
Beat’ and Other ‘1989’ Phrases, ROLLING STONE, Jan. 28, 2015, available at 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/taylor-swift-trademarks-this-sick-beat-
and-other-1989-phrases-20150128, could create exactly the Scylla and Charybdis 
problem identified in Dastar: the statutory license for musical works does not 
allow a licensee to make fundamental changes to the work.  17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) 
(2010). Complying with copyright law would force a statutory licensee to risk a 
trademark claim under Phoenix’s theory. 
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confusion of Phoenix’s own deliberate creation. Its attempt to circumvent 
copyright’s limitations—given Phoenix’s apparent lack of a copyright interest in 
the music tracks at issue—should not succeed. Cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New 
Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Comedy III”s argument 
that “the [video] clip at issue falls under the protection of the Lanham Act because 
it contains elements that in other contexts might serve as trademarks”).  
In fact, even assuming that consumers expected to get karaoke tracks 
arranged by Phoenix, that is exactly what they got. Trademark law gives Coca-
Cola the right to police the authenticity of its tangible goods, because a soda that is 
not made by Coca-Cola is not Coca-Cola. But Phoenix does not have the right to 
police the authenticity of its creative works under the Lanham Act. For that it must 
rely on copyright law.  
III. Conclusion 	
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be 
affirmed.  
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